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Information Theoretic Bounds on Authentication
Systems in Query Model
Reihaneh Safavi-Naini and Peter R. Wild
Abstract—Authentication codes provide message integrity guar-
antees in an information theoretic sense within a symmetric key
setting. Information theoretic bounds on the success probability of
an adversary who has access to previously authenticated messages
have been derived by Simmons and Rosenbaum, among others.
In this paper, we consider a strong attack scenario where the ad-
versary is adaptive and has access to authentication and verifica-
tion oracles. We derive information theoretic bounds on the success
probability of the adversary and on the key size of the code. This
brings the study of unconditionally secure authentication systems
on a par with the study of computationally secure ones. We char-
acterize the codes that meet these bounds and compare our result
with the earlier ones.
Index Terms—A-codes, authentication system, unconditional se-
curity, verification oracle.
I. INTRODUCTION
UNCONDITIONALLY secure authentication systemsprovide message integrity when the adversary’s computa-
tional power is unknown or unlimited. Unconditional security is
particularly important when recent advances in quantum com-
puting and prospect of discovery and realization of efficient
algorithms for solving “hard” problems, is taken into account.
In an authentication code (A-code) [1], [10], authenticated
messages (ciphertexts) encode states of an information source
(referred to as plaintexts or source states) by a mapping de-
termined by the shared key (also called the encoding rule).
A-codes are symmetric key systems. The receiver verifies the
authenticity of a message using the same key as the sender. In
a spoofing attack of order , a message-observing adversary
observes authenticated messages transmitted by the sender
and then tries to construct a fraudulent message called the
spoofing message that will be accepted by the receiver. We do
not make any assumptions about the computational power of
an adversary.
The performance of an A-code is measured by the probability
that the spoofing message is accepted by the receiver. Informa-
tion theoretic bounds [10], [7], [6] for A-codes give fundamental
limits on performance of the codes. Rosenbaum [7] and Pei [6]
Manuscript received November 20, 2006; revised October 2, 2007.
R. Safavi-Naini is with the School of Information Technology and Computer
Science, University of Wollongong, Wollongong, N.S.W. 2522, Australia and
also with the Department of Computer Science, University of Calgary, Calgary,
AB T2N 1N4, Canada (e-mail: rei@uow.edu.au).
P. R. Wild is with the Information Security Group, Royal Holloway Univer-
sity of London, Egham, Surrey TW20 0EX, U.K. (e-mail: P.Wild@rhul.ac.uk).
Communicated by Y. Zheng, Guest Editor for Special Issue on Information
Theoretic Security.
Digital Object Identifier 10.1109/TIT.2008.921683
independently derived a bound on the success probability of at-
tackers in spoofing of order and employed the bound to derive
a lower bound on the key size of A-codes. Extensions and al-
ternative derivations of these bounds are given by a number of
authors such as [2] and [4].
We extend this analysis by considering adversaries that may
be proactive in gathering information. The adversary might ob-
tain information from the sender by having the sender transmit
a message corresponding to source state of the adversary’s
choosing or might obtain information from the receiver by
sending a message of the adversary’s choosing and observing
whether or not the receiver accepts it. Safavi-Naini et al. [8]
have considered A-codes with such an adversary in the context
of unconditionally secure digital signature schemes (USDS)
[9]. This situation, the query model, is modeled in terms of an
authentication oracle (A-oracle) that provides the authenticated
message corresponding to a query source state (an A-query) in
the same way that the sender would and a verification oracle
(V-oracle) that provides a response accept or reject to a query
message (a V-query) depending on if the receiver would or
would not accept the message. This terminology parallels
that used for schemes relying on computational security. An
attack with access to an A-oracle corresponds to an adaptive
chosen plaintext attack, and an attack with access to a V-oracle
corresponds to an adaptive chosen ciphertext attack.
In this paper, we study unconditionally secure A-codes (sym-
metric key) under the query model and derive information the-
oretic bounds on the success probability of a query attacker.
A. Our Results
We consider an adversary who asks exactly queries, ob-
serving the responses of the oracle, and then spoofs. We analyze
this via an experiment in which the adversary uses a strategy to
choose each query adaptively, taking into account all queries
and responses previously observed.
1) Bounds on Success Probability: We derive information
theoretic bounds on the success probability of the adversary in
a general query, response attack model. This can be seen as a
generalization of the Rosenbaum–Pei lower bound [7], [6] for
spoofing of order .
2) Constructing Pure Optimal Strategies: An adversary’s
success chance is maximized when he uses an optimal strategy.
Finding optimal strategies requires solving a constrained max-
imization problem, taking into account all possible sequences
of query and responses, and it results in an adversary strategy
that is represented by a sequence of probability distributions.
We show that there always exists an optimal strategy for which
each of these probability distributions has the property that there
0018-9448/$25.00 © 2008 IEEE
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is a unique element with nonzero probability. Such a strategy is
called pure and we give a recursive algorithm that constructs
this pure optimal strategy.
3) Queries Do Not Decrease Success Chance: It is known
that an adversary’s expected chance of spoofing may decrease if
the adversary observes a message, compared with his expected
chance of spoofing when he spoofs without any observation. A
natural question, noting the adversary’s control on the choice of
the query, is whether it is always beneficial to the adversary to
ask a query if possible. We show that as long as there are “good”
queries, asking them will not reduce the average success chance
(it may improve it) and so they should be asked. Thus, there is
no requirement for the adversary to compute the probabilities in
order to make a decision on whether to query in each particular
case. In particular, in the case of verification queries for non-
trivial schemes, it is always a better strategy to ask the query
and then spoof than to spoof without querying.
4) Bounds on Key Entropy: In the case of authentication
queries, we use the bound on the probability of success to derive
a bound on the entropy of the key space. We establish a combi-
natorial characterization of the authentication schemes attaining
the bound which shows that optimal codes in the authentication
query model are also optimal codes in the message observing
model.
II. DEFINITIONS
A symmetric key authentication system provides integrity
guarantees for two parties, referred to as the sender and the
receiver, that share a secret key.
A (symmetric) authentication system consists of two algo-
rithms and is defined over three sets , , and
, called plaintexts (or source state), ciphertexts (or message),
and keys, respectively. The authentication algorithm
takes a key and a plaintext and generates a ciphertext .
We consider authentication systems without splitting in which
a key and a message determine a single ciphertext and the al-
gorithm is a one-to-one function. (For authentication sys-
tems with splitting a pair determines a subset of .) The
verification algorithm takes a key and a ciphertext
and returns a single bit . is defined in terms of
as follows: if , for some
and , otherwise. We have that, for all
and , it holds that . We
may also define a decryption function , which satisfies
for all and .
The sender and the receiver use a probability distribution
over to select a secret key. To send a source state to
the receiver, is encoded under to produce message
. The probability distribution is called the com-
municants’ strategy and is assumed to be public. The sender uses
the key to authenticate a sequence of plaintexts arising from the
source according to a specified probability distribution, also as-
sumed to be public, and transmits the corresponding sequence
of ciphertexts to the receiver. The probability distributions on
and together determine a probability distribution on
given by . A ciphertext
is valid for if and only if .
We denote by , , and the random variables on sample
spaces , , and , respectively, corresponding to these
probability distributions. We assume that the source produces
a sequence of distinct source states so that
, the probability that the next source state is
given that the sequence has arisen so far, is if
.
An authentication code can be represented by a matrix with
columns labeled by the messages and rows labeled by
the encoding rules. The entry in row and column is
if and otherwise. Alternatively, we may define
its encoding matrix. This matrix has columns labeled by the
source states and has rows labeled by the encoding rules. The
entry in row and column is the message . The
set of elements in row is denoted and has exactly
distinct messages. Thus, for an encoding rule , a message is
valid if and only if .
It is assumed that the adversary knows the encoding matrix
but does not know the actual secret encoding rule agreed upon
by the sender and the receiver.
A. Adversaries and Success Probability
The traditional adversary model for an authentication code is
an adversary who has access to authenticated messages and
attempts to construct a forged message (also called a spoofing
message) that would be accepted by the receiver. The best suc-
cess probability of the adversary in the above attack gives a
measure of the security provided by the code.
Simmons [10] derived an information theoretic bound on the
success probability of a spoofer when (an impersonation
attack). Rosenbaum [7] and Pei [6] independently derived a gen-
eral form of the bound for
(1)
where denotes a random variable associated with the se-
quence of observed messages .
The bound can be used to derive an information theoretic
bound on the entropy or uncertainty (and hence the length) of
the key in terms of the success probabilities .
1) Adversary With Oracle Access: In [8], the adversary
model was strengthened by the addition of access to authenti-
cation and verification oracles. This new adversary is adaptive
and can ask authentication and verification queries from corre-
sponding oracles. The oracles produce responses to queries in
the same way that the legitimate sender and receiver would.
For a given , an authentication oracle (also
called a signature oracle) takes as input a source state ,
computes , and returns response .
A verification oracle receives as input a ciphertext
, computes , and returns re-
sponse .
We use to denote a query (either an A-query or a V-query
) and use to denote a response (either or ). We denote the
set of queries by and the set of responses by . Thus,
and for A-queries and and for
V-queries. Let denote a sequence of el-
ements. We also use to denote the set . For
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, we say is a prefix of if . We use
, , , , and to denote a sequence of source states,
messages, queries, responses, and query and response pairs, re-
spectively. A strategy of an adversary is a collection of prob-
ability distributions that is used to select the queries and also
the final spoofing query. If is a sequence of query and
response pairs, then denotes the probability that is
chosen as the next query (or spoofing message) given that the
adversary has asked the sequence of queries and observed
the sequence of responses. An adversary’s strategy is a col-
lection of probability distributions .
Let be an adversary that has access to
both oracles and uses a strategy to adaptively ask A-queries
(receiving the response after each query) and then ask a
V-query. Let be an adversary that has access to
only a verification oracle and uses a strategy to adaptively ask
verification queries (receiving the response after each query)
and then ask a further verification query.
Consider the following experiments.
Experiment
after asking exactly queries of
and receiving corresponding responses
makes a query to
the oracle such that the return
, and




after asking exactly queries of
and receiving corresponding responses
makes a query to
the oracle such that the return
, and
was never asked of
the oracle
return return
The output of the experiment is a random variable
( or on ) corresponding to
the success or failure of an adversary who makes queries to an
oracle before spoofing with a (forged) message . Each run of
the experiment is one instance of the communicants’ strategy
and the adversary’s choices in his attack, and corresponds to
a sample point in a probability space where sample points are
labeled with a key (the communicants’ choice) and the adver-
sary’s sequence of query and response pairs , ,
where is the sequence of responses to the sequence of queries
( or ) and . Let denote the
probability of the sample point with label , . For the
sample points in which the forgery is considered successful the
experiment results in .
We compute the advantage of the forgers in the previous ex-
periments as the probability of the experiment resulting in
This is the average success probability over all keys (with
respect to the distribution given by the communicants’ strategy)
when the adversary uses strategy . We use the notation for
either of these quantities. This can be written as
The advantage function of is the advantage of a forger with
the highest success probability
The strategy of a forger with this advantage is called an optimal
strategy. We write for either of these quantities.
We say that a key is consistent with a query and response
pair if the following holds: 1) if , then it
holds that ; and 2) if ,
then it holds that . Let denote the
set of keys that are consistent with a query response sequence
. The conditional probability that the key
is given the sequence of query and response pairs is
nonzero only if . Similarly, for , let
. For
, we put if
and ; and , otherwise.
In the following, we assume is chosen by commu-
nicants and is unknown to the adversary. We introduce some
notation that records probabilities of certain events in the exper-
iments described previously. Put
(2)
where
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is the conditional probability that is the response to query
given that is the sequence of responses to the sequence
of queries . This is the probability in the previous experi-
ments of the instances that have as the prefix to their
label. This probability may be calculated from the communi-
cants’ strategy , the adversary’s strategy , and the authen-





This is the probability that the spoofing message is successful





This is the conditional probability in the previous experiments
that the instances with labels whose sequences of queries and
responses are prefixed by output .
For each , the advantage of the adversary may be
written
(7)
We write to denote the maximum of over all strategies
.
III. OPTIMAL STRATEGIES
The adversary’s strategy is a collection of probability dis-
tributions that are used to choose queries. We say that
is pure if there is a unique query, denoted , with
(so that for all other queries
). We say that a strategy is pure if is pure for each
.
Theorem 3.1: There always exists a pure optimal strategy for
an authentication system adversary who has oracle access.
Proof: We prove the theorem by constructing a pure
strategy that is optimal. Let the adversary have oracle queries
and a single spoofing query. Given any strategy of this
adversary, we show how to construct a pure strategy whose
advantage is at least that of , using recursive steps. To-
wards this end, we recursively determine strategies
such that the advantage of an adversary with strategy is at
least that of an adversary with strategy ; the advantage, for
, of an adversary with strategy is at least that
of an adversary with strategy ; and is pure for all
, . Since is pure, this will establish our
claim by taking to be an optimal strategy.
Now will differ from only in the distributions
used to choose the spoofing message. Thus, we are considering
instances with labels whose sequences of queries and responses
have a given prefix . For each , let be such
that
(8)
Put (and , otherwise). Thus, the
strategy is a pure strategy that chooses the spoofing
message optimally. For , put for all
.
Hence, is a strategy that is identical to except that each
is a special probability distribution with nonzero proba-
bility only corresponding to an optimal spoofing query .
Note that from (2), we have for all
. Also note that from (8), we have
for all so that
where the last equality uses (5).
Now
and the probability of success using strategy is at least that
using .
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For , we recursively define assuming
are defined. Now will differ from only in
the distributions . That is, for all , we
have for all , , and
so these strategies are pure. In this step, is replaced by
a pure distribution such that .
Consider instances with labels whose sequences of queries
and responses have prefix .
For each , let be such that
(9)
Put (and , otherwise). For , put
for all . Then, from (2), we have
for all . Also note
that from (9), we have
for all so that
Now
and the probability of success using strategy is at least that
using .
The strategy is a pure strategy and is optimal if is optimal.
We have and
and is an optimal spoofing message. Moreover, for each
, we have and
Thus, is an optimal query.
A. Bounds on Success Probability
We consider an adversary that uses strategy to make
queries (either A-queries or V-queries) to an oracle and then
constructs a spoofing query. Now is the proba-
bility that the resulting sequence of query and response pairs
is . We write to denote a random variable
that takes the values with respective probabilities
. The source distribution and the communicants’
strategy determine a distribution on . Let
be the probability that a message is transmitted by the sender
as the next message given the sequence of query and response
pairs .
Theorem 3.2: Let be an authentication system and let
be the probability of success of an adversary who spoofs opti-
mally after making oracle queries using strategy . Then
Moreover, equality holds if and only if, for all
with and all with
, we have and is
constant for all .
The proof of Theorem 3.2 is given in the Appendix. It is an
adaptation of the proof of Theorem 3.1 of Rosenbaum [7]. This
bound is analogous to Rosenbaum’s bound for a message-ob-
serving adversary, with the difference being that the distribution
associated with the random variable depends on both
the adversary’s and the communicants’ strategies while in the
message observing case it is determined by the communicants’
strategy and the source state distribution. This means that un-
like the case of a message observing adversary where the best
success chance is bounded by the quantity that he
cannot change, the case of an adaptive adversary with access
to query oracles allows him to influence
and so have a higher bound on the success chance. The bound
depends on the query strategy and applies to any spoofing
strategy. For good authentication systems, the best spoofing
strategy should meet the bound with equality.
As in [7], we have the following generalization. Let the values
for , and sequence of
query and response pairs be a joint probability distribution on
such that, if ,
then and, for all and ,
, the probability that
the encoding rule is and, for strategy , the sequence of
query and response pairs is . We write to denote a
random variable that takes values with respective
probabilities . The bound
in Theorem 3.2 becomes
(10)
B. Authentication Queries
When the adversary has access to an authentication oracle,
the sample points have labels with sequences of queries and
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responses of the form , and the probability of
output for a given sequence of queries and responses is given
by
where is the set of keys that satisfy
. Theorem 3.2 in its generalized form [expres-
sion (10)] can be written as follows.
Theorem 3.3: Let be an authentication system and let
be the probability of success of an adversary who uses strategy
and spoofs optimally after making oracle queries. Then
Moreover, equality holds if and only if, for all
with and all with
, we have and
is constant for all .
1) Bound on the Key Size: We prove a bound on the key
size in terms of the probabilities of success for an adversary
that has access to authentication queries, . Let
be a strategy such that for all , , we have
whenever . We define adversaries
, , with strategies
where . For , uses strategy
to ask oracle queries and then uses an optimal spoofing
strategy that gives him the best success chance. For ,
define for all , . Note
that is the probability distribution used by to select
the spoofing message. Also note that for all ,
the probability distribution used by the adversary for se-
lecting queries , , is the same as the probability
distribution used by the adversary .
The lower bound on the success probability of is
where denotes the random variable that takes
values with probability and is a
random variable that has the properties described at the end
of Section III-A. Since , we have
.
Let
where and , otherwise. This
is the distribution on query and response pairs , keys
, and transmitted messages , which arises when the source
state distribution is . Then, , if
.
Now is the distribution used by for selection
of the query . The random variable has distri-
bution satisfying
and
Thus, satisfies the conditions on described at the
end of Section III-A, and we have
where has the same distribution as responses to query
by the adversary .
Equivalently, the inequality may be written as
Theorem 3.4: Let be an authentication system. Then
Proof: For adversaries , , as described pre-
viously, we have
Note that
and since , we have
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Hence
Let . Then, it follows that .
IV. “GOOD” QUERIES DO NOT DECREASE
SUCCESS PROBABILITY
It is well known that for a message observing adversary, ob-
serving an extra message may reduce the success probability
of the adversary. For example, Massey [3] defined onefold se-
cure A-codes as codes that provide perfect protection against
spoofing of order and . For such codes with source states
and messages, we have and . Moreover,
the probability of success in spoofing of order is for each
spoofing message and the probability of success in spoofing
of order is for each observed message and spoofing
message . Thus, for these codes, observing any mes-
sage will reduce the success probability of the adversary.
The passive message observing adversary obtains informa-
tion from valid messages sent across the channel. On the other
hand, the active querying adversary obtains information from
the responses to the queries. Thus, there is a difference: in the
latter, the adversary can control the amount of information that
he receives.
Since adversaries with oracle access have some control of
the information that they receive a natural question is whether
asking queries is always helpful to such adversaries. For every
query, the adversary may calculate his best success chance be-
fore and after the query is asked and choose the one that gives
him the higher success chance. Of course, the probability of suc-
cess is unchanged if the adversary repeats a query that has been
made before, so we only need to consider the case where the
adversary makes distinct queries. We call a query “good” if it is
distinct from previous queries and if asking it will not reduce the
success chance of the adversary. Otherwise, a query is “bad.” In
the following, we show that the adversary only needs to look for
“good” queries and if there is one then he can be guaranteed that
asking the query will not decrease his success chance.
The following theorem gives conditions under which a query
is good. It follows that, in all but those special cases where no
query satisfies these conditions, asking another query is helpful
and the adversary’s probability of success is at least as great
with the extra query.
Theorem 4.1: Let be a strategy of an adversary who asks
oracle queries and then constructs a spoofing query for an au-
thentication system . Suppose that the adversary modifies the
strategy to ask one extra oracle query and then spoof optimally.
Then, an extra query is good if it is distinct from previous
queries and the following occurs: 1) in the case of verification
queries, is distinct from the unique optimal spoofing message
for strategy should one exist; and 2) in the case of authenti-
cation queries, there exists an optimal spoofing message for
strategy such that any key consistent with the previous query
and response pairs is not consistent with .
If there exists a good extra query for every sequence of query
and response pairs arising from , then for a suitable modifica-
tion, the adversary’s probability of success is at least .
Proof: Suppose that the adversary has observed the se-
quence of query and response pairs.
The expected success probability of the adversary after an-
other query is
where is
the conditional probability that the response is given the
sequence and the query . However
so this is
where or .
Suppose that is distinct from and the fol-
lowing occurs: 1) if , then there exists
with ,
and 2) if , then under any key , there
exists a message with and
.
With so defined, we have
and so
Thus, is a good query.
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It follows immediately that if there exists a good extra query
for every sequence of query and response pairs arising from
, then the adversary’s probability of success for a modified
strategy that chooses such a query with probability is at least
and the result follows.
Note that for verification queries the condition for existence
of a good query is nearly always satisfied. The exception is when
and so the only available query is the spoofing
query. As long as , there will be a good query and
so the success chance of the adversary would not be reduced if
that query is asked. Note, however, that there is no guarantee
that the success chance will be improved by asking a query.
For example, in the onefold secure A-codes of Massey [3], the
success chance is either with or without a verification query. A
query has probability of producing response and probability
of response . If the response is , then the success chance
is reduced to , while if the response is , the success chance
is increased to . Thus, the success chance if the adversary
asks a verification query is .
In the case of authentication queries, the theorem may not
imply the existence of a good query. This is the case if for some
sequence of query and response pairs arising from
every optimal spoofing message has the property that for any
there is an such that .
This is the case for the onefold secure A-codes of Massey [3],
where any authentication query reduces the success chance from
to .
Note that Theorem 4.1 is helpful as it provides the adversary
with a method to determine whether he should ask a query or
not: he simply checks whether there are good queries, and if
there are, then he is guaranteed to do better if he asks them.
V. OPTIMAL CODES
We consider optimal authentication codes that satisfy the
bound with equality. We use an argument
similar to Rosenbaum [7] and obtain a combinatorial charac-
terization of such authentication codes analogous to that in
the message-observing adversary setting. The codes will have
minimum number of keys and limit the best success chance of a
spoofer with access to queries to its minimum (that is, satisfy
bound of Theorem 3.2 with equality).
If equality holds, then it follows by Theorem 3.4 that
for and the proof of the the-
orem shows that and
for . Fur-
ther, equality holds in Theorem 3.3 and so, for an optimal
strategy (having the properties described above the state-
ment of Theorem 3.4), is constant for all
and .
Since is independent of , it follows that
(11)
and we have
Using an argument by induction on the number of query
and response pairs gives
(12)
for all . Further, another induction, on the number
of terms in the product, gives
(13)
for all . (See Appendix for proofs of these equa-
tions.)
Let be a sequence of distinct source states and
let . Let be the sequence of messages
with for . Then,
and since ,
we have and .
Hence, . Thus,
the distribution is uniform.
It follows that
and . Since
, we have and
. Thus, is an integer
and .
Thus, the optimal authentication systems determine a combi-
natorial structure. We may identify a pair satisfying
with an incidence in a combinatorial design.
The previous results show that an optimal authentication code
corresponds to a combinatorial design in which any query re-
sponse pairs are incident with a constant number
encoding rules. Since , the authentication code
is Cartesian and it follows that it is optimal in the message ob-
serving setting also. The authentication systems arising from
Reed–Solomon codes (or orthogonal arrays) (see [5]) that are
optimal in the message observing adversary setting also provide
examples of optimal codes in our query oracle setting.
VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS
We have given an analysis of authentication systems for an
adversary with access to oracle queries. We derived informa-
tion theoretic bounds on the best success probability of an ad-
versary using a strategy to ask queries and then construct a
spoofing query. This bound can be seen as a generalization of the
Simmons and Rosenbaum bound and is derived using the same
technique. The adaptive adversary, however, has the ability to
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influence the bound through his querying strategy as well as his
spoofing strategy while for a message observing adversary the
bound is only affected by this latter strategy. We also derived a
bound on the key entropy for an adaptive adversary with access
to authentication queries and showed that in this case for an
authentication system with probability of deception the key
entropy is at least . This is similar to the known
result for a message observing adversary.
We gave a combinatorial characterization of authentication
codes that meet the bounds and showed that optimal codes
(having the least success probability and the smallest number
of keys) correspond to orthogonal arrays. This is analogous to
the message observing case.
We gave a result to show that, in the query oracle model, as
long as there is always a good query, then asking that query is
helpful to the adversary.
APPENDIX
Proof of Theorem 3.2: The following proof is a direct ap-
plication of the proof used in [7] to the situation where the ad-
versary makes oracle queries instead of observing messages.
We will use Jensen’s inequality for convex functions. A real
function is convex on the interval if , for
all .
Theorem 7.1 (Jensen’s Inequality) [11]: Let
be nonnegative numbers such that . Let
be a real function that is convex on the interval and let
. Then
(14)
and equality holds if and only if all are equal.
The proof of Theorem 3.2 proceeds as follows.
Let
Because
it follows that and
is a probability distribution on .
Now we have





We will first show that
This is true because using (15), we have
Now as the adversary spoofs optimally, we have
and so
The final step uses Jensen’s inequality (14) for
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Proof of (11): We show that





where the sum is over .
However, by Theorem 3.3, is constant for
all , so that
and the result follows.
Proof of (12): We show that
For , we have , so
Suppose that and
for all . Since ,
so that
and because , we have
and the result follows.
Proof of (13): We show that




and the result follows.
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